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ABSTRACT. I suggest that some diagnoses can be seen as causal ex-
planations based on “particulars” – instead of regularities – and on 
the notion of actual causation. Diagnoses based on case-based rea-
soning provide a particularly vivid example.  
   
 
1.  Medical Diagnosis and Explanation 
 
Diagnostic problem solving is usually a complex procedure, which involves 
many steps and a plurality of cognitive and inferential activities. Once formu-
lated, however, a diagnosis can be synthetically described, from a statistical 
viewpoint, as a relation between a set of findings (signs, symptoms, laborato-
ry test results) and a certain pathological condition attributed to the patient. 
What kind of relation? According to a common opinion among experts in 
computational models, medical diagnoses express explanatory relations: for 
example, Reggia, Nau, and Wang (1983) state:  
 
[…] diagnostic reasoning involves a sequential hypothesize-and-test pro-
cessing during which the physician conceptually constructs a model of the pa-
tient. The “hypothesis” postulates the presence of one or more diseases that 
could explain the patient’s manifestations.  
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The claim that all diagnoses are explanations is not unanimously shared: 
Federspil (2004) distinguishes between nosographical and physiopatholog-
ical diagnosis and accepts as ‘explanation” only the latter, which aims at 
reconstructing mechanisms which have brought about the actual conditions 
of the patient and have a definite causal character; nosographical diagnosis 
would have instead only a classificatory character. 
It might be answered that in a classical treatment of explanation also 
nosographical diagnosis might be seen as explanation, only “non causal”. 
Hempel (1965, pp. 453-7) admits that subsumption under a concept can be 
explanatory, but only when the concept points to some kind of regularity, 
as in medical diagnosis. However I think that a characterization of medical 
diagnosis à la Hempel would not be fully satisfactory for two reasons: in 
some diagnosis the explicatory work is not given by regularities; besides, 
in such diagnoses, causality has a more important role than the one given 
by Hempelian models.  
 
 
2. Regularity-based Explanations 
 
In the inferential and regularist Hempelian view, the explanation of an indi-
vidual event – for instance that a person has a certain set of signs and symp-
toms (Si) – is given when the event can be deduced by a set of laws and par-
ticular facts. But in medical diagnosis we have weaker relations than deduc-
tion, and diagnoses have generally a probabilistic character. Diagnosis there-
fore is given when we can sort out the pathology which is the best explanation 
of the patient exhibiting Si. In a Bayesian approach, the best explanation is the 
pathology which appears more probable given Si, where the probability of 
each diagnostic hypothesis is computed with the Bayes formula. Such an ap-
proach permits to evaluate how the acquisition of new evidence changes the 
probability of different diagnostic hypotheses, facilitating comparisons among 
rival hypotheses. Bayesian diagnostic reasoning is made easier by the use of 
computational models, like Bayesian networks (see Pearl 1988, Pearl 2000, 
Spirtes, Glymour, and Scheines 1993). A Bayesian network is a directed 
graph in which nodes represent statistical variables, edges represent condi-
tional probabilities, and no cycles are allowed. Various assumptions, among 
which Markov assumption, allow uses of Bayesian nets as inference tools.  
Bayesian networks may have a probabilistic interpretation, and therefore 
model merely nosographical diagnoses, or a causal interpretation, and there-
fore represent possible physio-pathological mechanisms that could have pro-
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duced Si. Diagnostic procedures devoted to get the most probable hypothesis 
use type probabilities: the patient is seen as member of a population. 
Expert systems that use causal Bayesian networks make appeal to the no-
tion of probabilistic causality (see Long 1989), whose basic idea is that A 
causes B if A increases the probability of B. In both probabilistic and causal 
interpretations, the relations of probabilistic independence given by graphic 
models are relations among event types, and causal relations are relations of 
type causation. Therefore both probabilistic and causal diagnoses obtained 
through Bayesian Networks are based on types and on statistical regularities. 
This is no surprise, and nobody wants to cast doubts on statistical data and 
their role in clinical sciences. However, if we admit that some diagnoses aim, 
at least ideally, at reconstructing the process that produced a set of signs and 
symptoms in an individual patient, pointing towards a causal explanation of 
the patient’s individual condition, we may see that an explanation based on 
regularities and on general causal relations cannot be adequate. Probabilistic 
regularities and relations actually do not always explain individual cases. 
When a physician examines a patient who exhibits a symptom, she does 
not wants to discover what causes that symptom in general, or in humans: she 
wants to discover what caused the presence of the symptom in her patient. 
Causal diagnoses based on general knowledge and on regularities must con-
front with the fact that sometimes the most probable cause of a conditions in 
humans is not the actual cause of that condition in a given patient. The notion 
of actual causation, recently much debated among philosophers, could reveal 
more useful. But this notion is not based on regularities. 
 
 
3. Clinical Explanation and the Problem of Individuals 
 
The idea that diagnosis can be modeled as an explanation based on the study 
of individuals has been often considered in the philosophy of medicine. Go-
rovitz and MacIntyre (1976) stress the fact that medical science is character-
ized as science of particulars:  
 
every particular continues to exist and has the characteristics that it 
has only in virtue of the operation of some set of physical and chemi-
cal mechanism. Some particulars – ice cubes and molecules are nota-
ble examples – are such that nearly everything that we might want to 
know about them can be explained simply by citing the relevant 
mechanisms. 
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Other particulars, however, like the higher primates, “cannot be understood 
solely as the sum-total of the physical and chemical mechanisms that operate 
on them. What effects such mechanisms do have is affected by the particular 
history of that specific particular with all its contingent circumstances, contin-
gent that is, and even accidental, relative to the operation of the mechanism.” 
Gorovitz and MacIntyre want to stress that knowledge of individuals as given 
by medical science keeps always a degree of uncertainty, which does not 
come from an imperfect knowledge of regularities or initial conditions or 
both; on the contrary, the uncertainty derives from a necessary “ignorance of 
the contingencies of the environmental context”.  
  Schaffner (1986) has discussed the relation between the role of generaliza-
tions and the study of individuals in biomedical sciences. He claims that “the 
nature of biomedical theorizing requires an increased emphasis on what might 
be called prototype organisms and on analogical extension of biological 
knowledge” (1986, p. 68). Schaffner’s main point is that many  
biomedical theories lack generalization of broad scope”, focusing in-
stead on “an appropriate organism- often referred to as an ‘animal mod-
el’” and “articulates a mechanism […] that explain some feature(s) of 
that organism. […] The organism (or component part of the organism) 
is construed to be a prototype, and to have similarities with other organ-
isms […] that license the extension of the ‘mechanism’ to a broader 
class of biological entities. Such extension is typically analogical […] 
(Schaffner 1986, p.70).  
Schaffner gives some space also to clinical sciences, considered as the area 
where the “exemplar thinking” emerges with particular clearness. 
 
 
4. Case-based Diagnoses as Explanation based on Individuals 
 
An application of analogical reasoning to diagnosis which is gaining increas-
ing attention in health sciences is given by case-based reasoning (see Ankeny 
2006 and Bichindaritz 2008). Case-based reasoning is usually defined as a 
methodology of problem-solving based on the analogy to already solved simi-
lar problems. In clinical applications, case-based reasoning (CBR) starts by 
construction of an “index case”, i.e. a description, in more or less detail, of a 
particular case, often a report on an individual patient (Ankeny 2006); when a 
new diagnostic problem is presented, the case base is searched in order to find 
the best matching case(s) among the retrieved ones; the assessment of the sim-
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ilarity relations between the two cases can induce a modification of the index 
case (possibly by generating a more abstract index case) and/or the adoption 
of the new case as index case. In computer science, the standard description of 
CBR is the following: 
It basically consists in retrieving past cases that are similar to the cur-
rent one and in reusing (by, if necessary, revising) past successful solu-
tions; the current solved case can then be retained and put in the system 
knowledge base, called the case base or the case library.” (Montani 
2008) 
Even from these minimal sketch it should be clear that CBR is based on indi-
vidual cases (and analogies); it is true that often similar cases are used in order 
to obtain a generalization, an abstract prototype; but generalization is not the 
starting point of the problem solving procedure; rather, when applied to diag-
nostic problems, CBR appears as a model construction, where some individu-
als, or their clinical history – the retrieved cases - become the model for new 
cases. 
 
 
5. Case based Diagnoses and Actual Causation  
 
Answers to the question whether one particular event caused, or prevented, 
another, are judgments of actual causation. The peculiarity of actual causation 
emerges in situations of causal pre-emption, i.e. situations in which two con-
figurations of factors are present and both are nomically sufficient to bring 
about an effect, but just one of them actually causes it. For example, suppose 
that a patient has a leg edema (LE) and that it has been caused by a kidney 
problem (K), but our patient has also a cardiac problem (H) that would have 
nevertheless caused a leg edema. 
As it is well known, causal pre-emption has raised problems both to regu-
larity and counterfactual accounts of causation; however, here we consider 
just the counterfactual account, as it is the most appropriate to singular causa-
tion. In the case of our patient, there is a “causal situation” in which both K 
and H are causes of LE, but we have the intuitions that K is the actual cause of 
it. LE does not depend counterfactually on K, nor is K a proper difference-
maker w.r.t the patient’s situation, as LE would have been present anyway1. In 
                                                          
1 Obviously the cure should try to fix both K and H, but in many context the correct identi-
fication of the causes of the patient’s symptoms is important.  
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more promising recent works, actual causation is presented as counterfactual 
dependence which holds not in the actual situation, but “in a certain kind of 
‘normalized’ version” of it (Hitchcock and Knobe 2009). In our example, K 
causes LE in our patient if both K and LE are present, and if in a virtual, 
“more normal”,  situation in which the patient has no cardiac problem, his LE 
would counterfactually depend on K. Therefore the notion of actual causation 
seems strictly related to some standard or notion of “normality”. But what is 
normality? Hitchcock and Knobe (2009, p. 598) stress that the notion of nor-
mality is context- dependent, and that there are different systems of norms: 
beside statistical norms, we find moral norms, and also “norms of proper 
functioning that apply to artifacts and biological organisms (and their compo-
nents)”. 
What has all this to do with diagnoses and CBR? Our suggestion is that 
those diagnoses which are, to some extent, causal, aim to detect the actual 
causes of the patient’s condition. These causes can be characterized as differ-
ence-makers wrt. the ‘normal’ situation of the patient. But in this case, nor-
mality does not coincide necessarily with statistical normality (otherwise, im-
probable causes would be condemned to eternal ‘inactivity’). Rather, each in-
dividual is better characterized as the ‘proper’ functioning of a model which is 
similar to the individual in question under relevant aspects.  
Diagnosis via CBR can be seen as explanation based on difference from a 
norm of “proper functioning”: whenever an index case is inserted in a case 
base, it is inserted because it presents some abnormal features with respect to 
the “normal” abstract organism, i.e. a properly functioning organism. Howev-
er, when compared with a new case, it is the index case – as a prototype of 
abnormal functioning – that dictates the ‘norm’.  
 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
Case-based diagnosis seems to express a form of causal explanation linked to 
actual causation. This kind of diagnosis is not necessarily an alternative to 
other form of diagnoses, like those based on Bayesian probabilities; rather it is 
conceivable to apply ordinary Bayesian reasoning in standard problems and 
CBR in situation which appears to be nonstandard, as rare pathologies (see 
Montani 2008). In any case, CBR diagnosis offers an example of diagnosis 
that is compatible with the most recent idea of causal explanation based on 
actual causality.  
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